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Abstract—Network Coding is a new possibility to transmit
data through a network. By combining different packets instead
of simply forwarding, network coding offers the opportunity
to reach the Min-Cut/Max-Flow capacity in multicast data
transmissions. However, the basic schemes are vulnerable to so-
called pollution attacks, where an attacker can jam large parts
of the transmission by infiltrating only one bogus message. In the
literature we found several approaches which aim at handling
this kind of attack with different amounts of overhead. Though,
the cost for a specific secure network coding scheme highly
depends on the underlying network. The goal of this paper is
on the one hand to describe which network parameters influence
the efficiency of a certain scheme and on the other hand to
provide concrete suggestions for selecting the most efficient secure
network coding scheme considering a given network. We will
illustrate that there does not exist ”the best” secure network
scheme concerning efficiency, but all selected schemes are more
or less suited under certain network topologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network Coding as introduced by a Ahlswede et al. [2] is a
simple and elegant way to increase throughput in an arbitrary
network for a multicast scenario. It was shown by Li et al. that
linear network coding suffices to achieve the Min-Cut/Max-
Flow bound, which is the maximum for a single flow [16].
However, Network Coding also has its drawbacks. Due to the
design, it is highly vulnerable to so-called pollution-attacks,
where an active attacker can jam large parts of the network
by sending only one bogus message.
Because of this fact, there has been a lot of research into
security of Network Coding in the past few years. Whereas
some analysis deal with confidentiality [19], the vast majority
deals with preventing pollution attacks and keeping integrity
and availability of messages [3], [10], [12], [18]. Common
cryptographic solutions do not work, since data packets are
combined and therewith digital signatures or similar things
become invalid. That is the reason for using homomorphic
cryptographic functions, like homomorphic signatures [8],
[13], homomorphic message authentication codes (MACs) [1],
[21], or homomorphic hashes [9], [14]. Another possibility to
cope with secure network coding is to utilize time asymmetry
or more precisely to delay the release of data necessary for
verifying a data packet [5], [15], [17].
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Considering the variety of existing network coding schemes
preventing pollution attacks, the question arises which of these
schemes should be used. There are two important factors that
influence the answer: security and efficiency. Within this paper,
we focus on the efficiency aspect.
In the past we did some analysis of existing schemes
and compared the efficiency parameters of some prototypic
schemes. Although we only analyzed 3 specific network
graphs, the evaluations have shown that the efficiency highly
depends on the network [7]. The contribution of this paper is
to determine which scheme is best suited concerning efficiency
for a chosen network characterized by few parameters.
Within our analysis we focus on the dependency on the
network topology. Thus, we make simplifying assumptions
regarding the implementation on a specific machine.
Section II gives an overview on Network Coding and intro-
duces all schemes considered in the evaluation of this paper.
In Section III, we present several parameters for describing
efficiency and the network. The results of our analysis are
presented in Section IV. Section V concludes and gives an
outlook on further work.
II. OVERVIEW ON NETWORK CODING
A. Random Linear Network Coding
Network Coding is applied to a network given as a finite,
directed, acyclic graph G = (V,E) with a sending node
(source) s ∈ V, forwarding nodes (relays) F ⊂ V and receiving
nodes (sinks) R ⊂ V. For simplicity, we assume each channel
e ∈ E to be of unit capacity. Data packets xi sent through the
network consist of n symbols xi,j ∈ Fq each.
Unlike traditional routing, where a node simply passes a
data packet xi to the next node, a node computes various
combinations of its incoming data packets and sends them to
next nodes. On receiving l incoming messages, a forwarding
node randomly selects coefficients αi ∈ Fq , i = (1, ..., l) and
computes a linear combination of the received messages
xj =
l∑
i=1
αi · xi. (1)
that will be sent on its outgoing edges j.
For a practical implementation, we refer to Practical Net-
work Coding (PNC) [4]. PNC is a framework that enables all
receiving nodes R to decode the data packets without knowing
the coefficients αi randomly chosen by the forwarding nodes
F. The sender s divides the data into portions pi ∈ Fmq of
m symbols each. Furthermore, s constructs global encoding
vectors βi = (βi,1, βi,2, ..., βi,h) ∈ Fhq , where βi,j = 1 if
i = j and 0 otherwise. The data portions pi amended by the
global encoding vector βi establish the native data packets
xi = [βi,pi]. The value h represents the network capacity; h
data packets can be transmitted at once through the network
using network coding. These h data packets form a generation
G = [B,P ] with a unique identifier gid. All data packets of
one generation G can be arbitrarily combined according to
equation (1) on the flow to the receiving nodes R.
At the end of a transmission, all receiving nodes r ∈ R will
have at least h data packets which form a matrix. If the rank of
this matrix is h, the receiving nodes can successfully decode
the message by solving a system of linear equations. Although
full rank at the receiving nodes cannot be guaranteed, the
probability for decodability depends on the field size q. For
normal PNC it is sufficient to use at least q = 28 [11].
B. Selected Schemes Secure against Pollution Attacks
The solely implementation of PNC is vulnerable to pollution
attacks. All data packets of a generation G span a linear
subspace which is left if even one data packet is polluted and
does not lie in this subspace anymore. Thus, the receiving
nodes cannot decode messages. This necessitates the forward-
ing nodes F to recognize corrupted packets.
There are plenty of different schemes developed which
cannot entirely be addressed here, thus, we focused on 4
prototypic and substantially different schemes which should
represent main approaches. In the following, the selected
schemes are shortly explained to get a rough idea how they
work. For a more detailed explanation, we refer to the given
sources.
a) Homomorphic Hashes [9]: The main idea is to use
a homomorphic hash function and distribute digitally signed
packets with hashes of the native data packets a priori. Hence,
the sender computes for each native data packet pi a hash
value h(pi). Forwarding nodes can verify the combined data
packets xi = [βi,pi] by checking
h(pi)
?
= h(p1)
βi,1 · h(p2)βi,2 · ... · h(ph)βi,hmod r.
The hashes are 128 byte each, whereas the field size of the
codewords is about q ≈ 2256.
b) DART [5]: DART uses time asymmetry to deliver
delayed checksums of a generation. The network coding works
as in PNC. Additionally, the sender periodically computes and
broadcasts checksum packets containing a checksum chks(G),
a seed s, and a timestamp t for the current generation G. The
checksum is computed based on a pseudo random matrix Hs
that can be derived from the seed s. Each node buffers received
data packets until a checksum packet arrives. Only data packets
received before the creation of a checksum can be verified by
this checksum. For verification, the node generates Hs and
checks if the product of checksum and global encoding vector
equals the product of random matrix and encoded data
βichks(G)
?
= piHs.
c) Homomorphic MACs based on Time Asymmetry [20]:
The concept of this scheme is to utilize symmetric authentica-
tion by means of homomorphic MACs (Message Authentica-
tion Codes). The necessary key exchange is realized by means
of delayed key release. The MACs are integrated into the
data packets. The sender computes a chain of seed values that
are the basis for computing the keys necessary for computing
the MACs. The final value of this chain, which is important
for checking the validity of the other seed values, is digitally
signed and broadcasted to all nodes.
The remaining seed values are periodically broadcasted to
the other nodes for verifying the data packets. After checking
the seed value, the node computes the necessary keys and
checks the MACs. The data packets with MACs are combined
according to formula (1). For security reasons, the size of a
symbol is increased to q = 2128.
d) RSA-based scheme [8]: This scheme takes advantage
of the homomorphic property of the basic RSA signature
scheme. The sender computes a digital signature for each data
packet and integrates it into the particular packet.
Forwarder and receiver can verify signatures with the
sender’s public test key. Due to the homomorphic property,
nodes can combine packets and compute valid signatures for
the combined data packets without knowing the private signing
key. The signature is computed modulo a composite number N
of 2048 bit. In contrast to the other schemes, the data symbols
are integers instead of finite field elements. Thus, every data
packet will grow by the number of hops k and the number of
ingoing edges, which we roughly substitute with the multicast
capacity h.
III. INFLUENCE OF NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS ON
EFFICIENCY
A. Parameters for Describing Efficiency
Efficiency is a rather vague term. In this context, efficiency
considers additional operations, memory and communication
overhead in comparison to ordinary Network Coding. How-
ever, computational time, memory usage or latencies highly
depend on the implementation and on the underlying system.
Since we aim at describing the influence of network topologies
on efficiency, we selected the 3 following parameters accord-
ing to [7].
The relative payload P describes the ratio of the payload
data which can be decoded at all receiving nodes R to all
data sent by the sending node s including also additional
data, e.g., hashes, checksums, MACs, or digital signatures.
This data overhead has to be sent either in extra data packets
or is integrated into existing data packets. Depending on the
network topology, it is often necessary to send data packets or
extra packets multiple times on different links, which increases
the overhead again. Hence, this parameter should assess the
overall effort for the sender.
For comparing the time needed for an transmission we
evaluate the number of ticks T necessary for sending the
messages to all receiving nodes R. We define that within one
tick (time slice) a node can process all necessary packets and
send on all outgoing edges concurrently.
Comparing the number of ticks necessary for transmitting
one generation does not yield meaningful results since the
payload per data packet strongly depends on the applied
scheme. Hence, it is more reasonable to evaluate the number
of ticks needed for a certain amount of data B.
For all schemes, we did not consider any pipelining meth-
ods, but assume sending generations sequentially. Hence, we
need to divide B by the payload per packet to get the number
of generations and multiply this with the number of ticks per
generation. The result should highly correlate with the actual
delay and the time necessary for transmission.
Another method to describe the communication overhead
is simply to count all send operations O in the network for
the transmission of all necessary data. The number of sending
operations O mainly depends on the number of edges |E|.
However, this is a constant factor for all schemes so we can
set them to any positive integer and the difference between
the schemes will stay proportionally. For the same reason like
in number of ticks, we used a special amount of data B to
ensure comparability.
Considering a constant packet size, the number of send op-
erations estimates the communication overhead more realistic
than the relative payload. Despite this, the number of send
operations rates the overall effort within the whole network.
B. Parameters for Characterizing the Network
A network is characterized by many parameters, like num-
bers of nodes, edges, receivers, incoming edges, etc. Based
upon the results in [7], these parameters may influence the
efficiency of a secure network coding schemes to a different
degree. Thus, we can reduce the parameters for characterizing
the network to the most significant ones for keeping the
evaluation manageable.
At the end, we only analyzed the maximum path length
from the sending node s to any receiving node ri, i.e., the
number of hops k and the multicast capacity h, which can be
determined via a Min-Cut/Max-Flow algorithm. Other network
parameters, e.g., number of edges |E| like mentioned before
surely have an impact on the efficiency parameters, too.
However, their influence can be described by a constant factor
so the relation between the schemes is not changed.
For the RSA-based scheme it is also important to know
the average number of incoming edges for each node. We can
roughly substitute this value with the multicast capacity h. The
same applies to the number of outgoing edges of the sending
node that is also approximated by h.
All in all, we have only two main parameters to consider
when we would like to know which of the secure network
coding schemes has the best efficiency regarding a certain
network topology. Although these assumptions are reasonable,
they have to be checked before applying to a given network.
C. General Assumptions
The packet size n is of high importance for all schemes
because the overhead within one packet or transmission stays
static in most cases so that the packet size directly influences
the payload per data packet. But setting the packet size too
large will introduce too high delays as well. Thus, we assumed
n = 1500 byte according to the size of an IP packet.
The generation id gid must be large enough to prevent
replay attacks (infiltrating an old data packet into a new
generation to jam the network) but also small enough to keep
the overhead acceptable. Therefore, we assume a size of 8
bytes for an ascending gid. Further details about the formats
of the packets can be found in [6].
Furthermore, some parameters are responsible for the secu-
rity level of the network coding schemes. We assume a size
of 128 byte for the digital signatures as reasonable. For the
RSA-based scheme we use a composite modulus of size 2048
bit. Other scheme specific parameters, e.g. size of the finite
field, the hashes, the checksum, etc., are set to those values
recommended in the original papers.
IV. EVALUATING THE SELECTED SCHEMES
A. Dependencies
We analyzed all selected schemes in order to derive for-
mulas describing the efficiency parameters dependent on the
network parameters k and h. We will shortly explain how we
derived the formulas by the example of the Homomorphic
Hash scheme. The other formulas are derived in a similar
manner; they are given in the appendix.
The relative payload depends on the payload per generation
and the amount of data to be sent for the sender s at all.
A data packet for the homomorphic hash scheme contains the
gid (8 byte), the global encoding vector (32 byte ∗h since q ≈
2256), and the payload data. One generation contains h data
packets. Additionally, we need h (for each direct subsequent
node) extra packets with hashes (128 byte * h), and a signature
plus gid for each extra packet (136 byte). The number of
extra packets can be computed by dividing the space for the
hashes by the packet size less the signature plus gid. The
corresponding formula for relative payload P is:
PHH =
h(n− 32h− 8)
h(n+ 128h+
⌈
128h
n−136
⌉
∗ 136)
The number of ticks T mainly depends on the number of
hops k. For homomorphic hashes, we have to transmit at least
one hash packet in advance. Thus, we have to sum up k and
the number of hash packets. Additionally, we need to get the
number of generations by dividing the amount of data we want
to transmit by the payload data per data packet:
THH =
⌈
B
(n− 32h− 8)
⌉
∗ (k +
⌈
128h
n− 136
⌉
)
The number of sending operations O has three factors: the
number of generations, the number of sending operations per
edge in one generation, and the number of edges |E|. Each
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Fig. 1. Results for relative payload P . Figures (a-d) show the reachable payload for the individual schemes. Figure (e) shows which schemes are best suited
for a pair (h,k). Figure (f) shows the corresponding payload when using the best suited scheme.
node has to send one data packet and at least one hash packet
per generation. Hence, we get:
OHH =
⌈
B
(n− 32h− 8)
⌉
∗ (1 +
⌈
128h
n− 136
⌉
) ∗ |E|
Based on these formulas, we computed the efficiency pa-
rameters for h ∈ [1, 50] and k ∈ [1, 200]. The corresponding
diagrams are displayed in Figure 1 (relative payload), Figure
2 (number of ticks) and Figure 3 (send operations).
Thereby, the first 4 diagrams always show the individual
results for each scheme. Further, we evaluated for each pair
of parameters (h, k) which scheme is the most efficient and
mapped it to the diagram (e). At the end, we combined all
diagrams and show what efficiency level is achievable when
always using the best scheme.
Generally, increasing values for k and h imply an increased
number of send operations as well as an increased number
of ticks, but a decreased relative payload. To assure a good
visibility of the results, the axis of the diagrams are arranged
differently in Figure 1 and Figure 2 and 3. Furthermore, we
chose for the latter B = 20000 Bytes to compute the absolute
values. However, increasing or decreasing B will not change
the shape of the diagrams or the map of best schemes, but only
the absolute values for number of ticks and send operations.
B. Discussion
As to be expected, there is no scheme that achieves the
best relative payload P in all network topologies. The payload
decreases for increasing h at Homomorphic Hashes, whereas
the maximum number of hops k does not have any influence.
In contrast to this, the payload of the DART scheme is highly
dependent on k, so that h has minor importance. For Homo-
morphic MACs and the RSA-based scheme both increasing
of k and h decreases the payload. In addition, we found out
that there exists combinations of h and k where both schemes
are unable to communicate, i.e., the payload is zero (For larger
values h and k this could also happen to Homomorphic Hashes
and DART). Surprisingly, all 4 schemes have their right to
exist, since each of them is superior to the other schemes for
certain pairs (h,k). This fact produces an interesting diagram
for the overall best, where both network parameters influence
the payload. Though, using the best scheme will result in a
small relative payload P for large h and k anyway. Certainly,
we have to consider that a higher h also means more data at
the recipients, which compensates the low relative payload.
The different suitability of the schemes for varying h and k
continues with number of ticks T . For Homomorphic Hashes,
again mainly depends on the multicast capacity h; but in
contrast to the relative payload, the number of hops k has
also a moderate influence. In DART, the number of hops
k is the main influence on T again. Homomorphic MACs
and the RSA-based scheme are influenced by both network
parameters h and k, again. However, for Homomorphic MACs
the multicast capacity is more relevant for the ability to send
than for amount of ticks, because we have combinations of
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Fig. 2. Results for number of ticks T (B = 20000 byte). Figures (a-d) show the number of ticks for the individual schemes. Figure (e) shows which
schemes are best suited for a pair (h,k). Figure (f) shows the corresponding number of ticks when using the best suited scheme.
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Fig. 3. Results for send operations O (B = 20000 byte). Figures (a-d) show the number of send operations for the individual schemes. Figure (e) shows
which schemes are best suited for a pair (h,k). Figure (f) shows the corresponding number of send operations when using the best suited scheme.
h and k again where both schemes fail to work, since the
overhead data would exceed the packet size. Altogether, this
implies for the map of the best suitability of the schemes that
we have only 3 groups and the Homomorphic MAC scheme
does not show best performance for any combination of h and
k. At the end, we can show a diagram of the overall best which
mainly is a combination of Homomorphic Hashes and DART
regardless of a small area (k < 10 and large h > 10) where
the RSA-based scheme performs best.
Except for minor changes, the main statement remains for
the send operations O. Whereas Homomorphic Hashes are
still mostly dependent on the multicast capacity h, the send
operations for DART are mainly influenced by k. Homomor-
phic MACs and the RSA-based scheme will also not work
for certain values of h and k and both schemes are dependent
on both parameters. The diagram of the best suited scheme
shifts slightly. Now DART’s performance is only better than
the performance of Homomorphic Hashes for h > 40. A small
area where the RSA-based scheme suits best still remains.
V. CONCLUSION
To conclude, the maps of best suited schemes are similar for
all efficiency parameters. For a moderate multicast capacity
h and a high number of hops k, the Homomorphic Hashes
seems to be best suited. For the contrary, i.e., large multicast
capacity h and low number of hops k, one should prefer the
RSA-based scheme. And for both large h and k DART is
the best solution. However, even Homomorphic MACs can
provide best efficiency if you mainly consider the relative
payload and adopt it for a network with h and k around 30.
For using the schemes in practice, a deeper security analysis
is necessary. A further topic of future work is an efficiency
analysis that takes computational time or memory space into
account. We are currently working on a network simulator that
is necessary for these evaluations.
APPENDIX
a) Relative payload:
PDART =
h(n− h− 8)
h(n+ k(142 + 2h))
PHMAC =
h(n− 16(h+ k)− 8)
h(n+ 24k + 152)
PRSA =
(n− 264− k(h+ 5)(1 + dld(h)e8 ))
n
b) Number of ticks:
TDART =
⌈
B
(n− h− 8)
⌉
∗ (3k − 1)
THMAC =
⌈
B
(n− 16(h+ k)− 8)
⌉
∗ (0.5k2 + 1.5k)
TRSA =
⌈
B
(n− 264− k(h+ 5)(1 + dld(h)e8 ))
⌉
∗ k
c) Send operations:
ODART =
⌈
B
(n− h− 8)
⌉
∗ (k + 1) ∗ |E|
OHMAC =
⌈
B
(n− 16(h+ k)− 8)
⌉
∗ (k + 2) ∗ |E|
ORSA =
⌈
B
(n− 264− k(h+ 5)(1 + dld(h)e8 ))
⌉
∗ |E|
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